... yes, they're there. But the important question concerns whether they're sufficient to tell us anything about the propriety of having a child. Frankly, I don't think that they count for all that much: the child wouldn't suffer (given that the comparator is never coming to exist at all).
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 10:01, Reply)
and the child wouldn't suffer from that, either.
She may well make an excellent parent; then again, she may teach the child racist views from the 50s and sit there drooling while leaving the thing to starve in the corner.
It's the increased risk of these negative aspects that rankles; if she was having a child for the child's benefit, she would've done it four decades ago to produce optimum conditions, so it seems like she's accepting these possible negatives that the child, not her, will have to deal with to satisfy her own cravings.
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 10:11, Reply)
That doesn't make sense. It's not as if there's a holding-pen of pre-embryos checking their watches and demanding that someone get round to bringing them to birth.
See my answer above for a response to the cravings point. It doesn't stack up either.
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 10:20, Reply)
so we can't say that this child will have a better life being born than not being born. The thing doesn'tt exist, so we can't say that the life it will have is better than otherwise. It's not like if if doesn't get born to her, it'll get born to someone else...it would just never exist.
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 10:32, Reply)
So, if the child is born, it'll increase the level of net welfare in the world (almost inevitably - leave aside the small possibility of a life so blighted that it's not worth living).
In other words, a world with the child is a better world than one without. Therefore, if we're concerned to maximise welfare, we ought to welcome (if not encourage) the pregnancy.
/Derek Parfit blog.
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 10:53, Reply)
Would it have that much impact?
Or would we need a sustainable campaign to see this benefit of welfare increase? A sort-of 'IVF For All!'?
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 10:56, Reply)
If it's welfare concerns that fuel your objections, though - and that does seem to be the case - then the point would stand that it's at least possible that you should be advocating IVF for all.
It's a slightly diluted version of what Parfit calls "the repugnant conclusion" - essentially, that if you think that welfare is the most important consideration in moral decisionmaking, and given that a world with many people living just-about bearable lives could well be better than one with many fewer people living slightly better lives, then it looks like we ought to go for the highly populated and more miserable world.
Parfit doesn't like the conclusion, but admits that it's one that he can't easily avoid given his other claims about welfare, identity and so on.
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 11:03, Reply)
The welfare concern isn't really a factor in my thoughts at all, outside of the individual welfare of the child (so not on a grand scale).
How is Parfitt defininf 'welfare' when he talks about it being the most important consideration in a moral decision? Socially, personally, economically...?
Why does he believe that world a, with more people could well be better than world b, with it's seemingly higher living standards?
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 11:13, Reply)
The argument'd still work formally.
I can't remember exactly how the argument works, but it's encapsulated here:
The Repugnant Conclusion: For any possibile populaiton of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.
See Reasons and Persons secs 131, but also 146-7. Actually, the whole thing. It's a deceptively difficult book - I don't claim nearly to have taken a lot of it in - but very rewarding if you stick with it...
(, Wed 15 Jul 2009, 11:23, Reply)