There is, for example, a modal distinction between figure or motion and corporeal substance in which both exist;
there is a similar distinction between affirmation or recollection and the mind. Of the latter kind we have an illustration in our
ability to recognize the one of two modes apart from the other, as figure apart from motion, and motion apart from figure;
though we cannot think of either the one or the other without thinking of the common substance in which they adhere.
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Tue 31 Mar 2009, 2:52,
archived)
ability to recognize the one of two modes apart from the other, as figure apart from motion, and motion apart from figure;
though we cannot think of either the one or the other without thinking of the common substance in which they adhere.
I might have to agree, as he connects 'god' to this 'nature' in the previous section.
However, he does present an interesting position vis the relationships 'we' make when looking at things.
To quote him from a little later in that section...
For example, because any substance which ceases to endure ceases also to exist,
duration is not distinct from substance except in thought; and in general all the modes
of thinking which we consider as in objects differ only in thought, as well from the
objects of which they are thought as from each other in a common object.
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Tue 31 Mar 2009, 3:03,
archived)
To quote him from a little later in that section...
For example, because any substance which ceases to endure ceases also to exist,
duration is not distinct from substance except in thought; and in general all the modes
of thinking which we consider as in objects differ only in thought, as well from the
objects of which they are thought as from each other in a common object.