Can Cartesian interactionism be compatible with the principle of the conservation of energy if we accept that we don't have free will?
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 15:40, archived)
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 15:43, archived)
but the physical world is the world that is subject to the principle of conservation of energy
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 15:46, archived)
I can put more energy into the physical world by deciding to do a little boogie.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 15:48, archived)
but it's not really physical energy. Dancing doesn't violate the law of conservation of energy, whether it's by free will or not.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 15:49, archived)
consider two degenerate quantum states that a particle could be in. A transition of one to the other can happen spontaneously since both states are at the same potential, but whichever state the particle occupies is nevertheless a piece of information. This is the basis of a great many thought experiments, such as the infamous Schrodinger's Cat example, and is also the principle behind quantum teleportation. According to the usual interpretation of Bell's Inequality, the information content of any measurement of a quantum event did not exist in the Universe before the point of observation. Information is therefore not conserved in the physical universe, even though energy and momentum are.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 15:52, archived)
there's your answer, comma. the universe has a cop-out clause
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 15:54, archived)
but that's not the question, although I'm particularly intrigued by the idea of dualism without free will, because without that, surely the whole idea is redundant.
It's redundant anyway, but in this case, it's doubly redundant.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:09, archived)
I thought you meant "how could there possibly be mind" rather than "why should mind exist".
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:18, archived)
If there were no free will, the mind would be incapable of making any kind of decision, because a decision is an instance of free will. And the definition of a mind is the seat of intelligence - i.e. the decision making process. Without free will, the mind would be bound only to observe the world and never act upon it, so as a means to explain human behaviour and abilities it accounts for nothing.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:23, archived)
Decision-making is only one part of the mind, along with consciousness, memory, imagination etc.
It's possible that we should have the perception of decision-making without actually making any decisions.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:28, archived)
memory, imagination and consciousness.
I don't think it goes along side them like you suggest.
"Perception of decision making" is a nonsense. You are still making a decision, even if you don't act on that decision.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:31, archived)
that all of my actions and experiences, including my perception of decision-making, are causally determined by something other than me, so even if I think I could have chosen to act differently, I actually couldn't.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:34, archived)
Although it's correct that all of your decisions are influenced by outside sources, they are not governed by those. The deciding factor is always your own mind, no matter how you choose to define your own mind.
I think there is only one way you will act at any point. You can think "what if I did this differently", but the point is you can never have acted differently. However, this is a result how your own mind interprets outside influences, the decisions are all your own mind's.
I'm not making sense.
*hums*
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:38, archived)
which is fair enough as I've never seen a really good definition of it yet.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:43, archived)
but I'll give you the other two. Whether we have the perception of free will or not, the point is that without it the mind would have no influence on the world at all, even if the world could still have an influence on the mind. If that were the case, I am bound to merely spectate as my body argues about dualism. And if it is capable of that without me, what am I for?
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:33, archived)
I'm not claiming that it's not bizarre on this view that there should be mind as well as matter, just that it's not illogical.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:37, archived)
It is necessarily impossible to disprove anything that's redundant, like invisible unicorns and teapots in space. Yes, I even used those analogies.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:41, archived)
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:39, archived)
when he's writing them.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:44, archived)
But my feelings on Tom Stoppard are due to A Level English Literature.
being forced to analyse Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead for weeks on end leads to a general feeling of "shut up, I don't care anymore".
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:49, archived)
All that needs to be transferred is your mind's "orders", and the world's response to that in the form of perceptions. Energy is only defined in terms of physically measurable quantities in any case, so it makes little sense to consider it leaving or entering the physical universe whether it is conserved or not.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:12, archived)
Surely perceptions exist in the mind.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:19, archived)
if the source of the information is not the world, but is internal to the self, it is a fantasy or dream.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:26, archived)
Can you expand on what information is? I think that's where I'm falling down.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:31, archived)
of trying to explain the idea of information without transmitting a great deal of it in the process. It's a bootstrapping problem.
Personally, I believe information to be the fundamental substance of everything. Every measurement or observation you can possibly make comes down to information, any theory you can come up with is information, any decision you can make is information. A desk and chair is information. You and I are information.
But more specifically, I suppose, information is a decision.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:37, archived)
I don't hold out much hope for my understanding of this, but I'm sure you're right.
(, Sat 16 May 2009, 16:39, archived)